Peter Ullrich: Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, in: Themenportal Europäische Geschichte, 2025, www.europa.clio-online.de/essay/id/fdae-154267.
The definition of the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) cannot be understood without its much more influential counterpart, the definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), that it responded to. That is why this dossier actually deals with both: with their backgrounds and objectives, their structures and specific provisions, and their examples and explanations, “with the aim of making it at least conceivable to ground the general, predominantly highly emotional discussion.”
The dossier describes the JDA’s main achievement as differentiating and delimiting the phenomena that can be described as antisemitic, in line with a measurable definition. This makes it possible to identify the manifestations of Israel-related antisemitism in their respective contexts, without precipitous closures. According to the JDA, only phenomena that are directed against Jews and Judaism as such, in whatever context, are antisemitic per se. In addition, there are phenomena that are not antisemitic per se but can be antisemitic depending on the context. The JDA demands that in the case of statements and actions that are not antisemitic per se, the anti-Jewish intent must be proven based on knowledge of the context and cannot simply be asserted. “This conceptual tool for clarifying gray areas in the discourse on Israel-related antisemitism cannot be praised highly enough,” the dossier states. The JDA does recognize that Israel-related phenomena can be antisemitic per se in any given context, for example when classic antisemitic stereotypes are applied to Israel or when Jews are being held liable for actions of the State of Israel. But denying Israel’s right to exist is not antisemitic in every context. The researchers involved in the JDA struggled for a long time to reach a common position before agreeing on the following wording: it is antisemitic to “deny Jews in the State of Israel the right to live collectively and individually in accordance with the principle of equality” – not to challenge any state’s existence.
This is in stark contrast to the IHRA definition. Although the IHRA definition also states that the “overall context” must be taken into account when assessing antisemitism, it does not seek to narrow down the group of phenomena to be considered antisemitic, but rather to broaden it. The examples given in the IHRA definition also include statements that are not directed against Jews in every context, but should, in every context and always, be considered antisemitic; first and foremost the denial of Israel’s right to exist. According to the IHRA definition, boycott movements such as BDS are also always to be classified as antisemitic, regardless of their actual objective, e.g., when they react to human rights violations.
The dossier counters criticism of the JDA definition that it allegedly sets too high a bar for classifying “worldview-based anti-Zionism as antisemitic” and argues that these are questions of degree that can only be answered in a differentiated manner. And it suggests that it is also researchers involved in the JDA who are affected by the consequences of the IHRA definition, namely those who speak out “against the concrete form of the Zionist movement and statehood” of Israel. These researchers, too, are exposed to accusations of “worldview-based anti-Zionism,” which, in cases of doubt, is considered antisemitic under the IHRA definition. However, the antisemitism accusation prevents serious engagement with the context that led these researchers to their position. Here one can clearly see the fundamental asymmetry between these two definitions and the resulting problems for their academic discussion and their (legal) application.
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