Tom Delgado, What is Happening in Iran w/ Historian Arang Keshavarzian, February 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeBpyHx–Cs.
In this interview by the Comedian and Tour Guide Tom Delgado, historian Arang Keshavarzian, a specialist on modern Iran and the Persian Gulf, sheds light on Iran’s current crisis. Although the protests from late December 2025 to mid-January 2026 fit within Iran’s long tradition of protest, the nature and dynamics of these protests, as well as the scale of violence used by the Iranian regime, are unprecedented.
Keshavarzian highlights factors shaping Iran’s domestic and foreign predicament that are often overlooked in media coverage and Campist debates while avoiding definitive predictions on outcomes. These factors include:
1. Iran’s 20+ year history of regional and nationwide protests feature diverse groups with varied demands. Key examples include the 2009 Green Movement over election fraud; 2017–2018 and 2019 uprisings against economic crisis, unemployment, high fuel prices, and Khamenei’s rule; and the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests following the state murder of Kurdish Jina Mahsa Amini, demanding broader political change and an end to the regime beyond mandatory hijab.
2. The ongoing impact of foreign interventions, from the US- and U.K.-backed 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who sought oil nationalization, through Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s repressive rule, and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to today’s protests blending legitimate grievances and demands, likely CIA and Mossad involvements, and the regime‘s brutal crackdown. One example Keshavarzian cites to illustrate foreign powers’ co-creation of a regime-change narrative is former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s New Year’s 2026 X post: “Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them.”
3. The Iranian regime’s eroding social base amid corruption, repression, sanctions, the June 2025 12-day war with Israel, and economic mismanagement.
4. The information war, including diaspora media outlets like Iran International and Manoto, which foster US/Israeli intervention and promote Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah, as Iran’s sole political alternative to the Mullahs. While some Iranians chant for Pahlavi and a nostalgic return to monarchy, others inside Iran and in the diaspora, who were persecuted under his father’s rule and are aware of its repressive nature, oppose him. Reza Pahlavi is also highly exclusive and hostile toward Iran’s ethnic and political diversity, prioritizing US/Israeli ties.
5. Prospects for the Iranian people, trapped between regime massacres and foreign powers like the US and Israel, that are exploiting the protests for their own political agendas.
Keshavarzian notes that most key leaders and groups capable of forming a political opposition or alternative in Iran have been brutally crushed, imprisoned, or executed by the regime. Some opposition groups, he says, want new negotiations to address not just foreign policy but also domestic issues: ending repression and the highly securitized atmosphere, enabling press freedom and internationally supervised elections, and creating conditions for unions, feminists, workers, environmentalists, and academics to regroup and strengthen again.
Keshavarzian adeptly analyzes this pivotal juncture by integrating political, economic, social, and geopolitical factors, amid current US-Israel-Iran tensions oscillating between negotiation and war rhetoric. Notably neglected in the interview, perhaps due to Keshavarzian’s academic framing, as he is pointing out himself, are the roles of workers’ unions, strikes, and struggles by ethnically marginalized groups in Iran (e.g., those of the Kurds and Baloch). Yet these efforts diversify Iranian perspectives on future governance.