Tag: International Law

  • BDS: A call to boycott institutions, not individuals

    Protest against Israel. Dörthe Engelcke (MPI) on the Academic Boycott Conference, January 24, 2026, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/academic-boycott-konferenz-in-berlin-interview-doerthe-engelcke-rechtswiss-100.html.

    The conference on the background and strategies of the academic boycott, organized primarily by students and held in Berlin from January 23 to 25, at least took place without disruption—at a location that was only revealed to participants at short notice. Dörthe Engelcke explains on Deutschlandfunk radio from a legal perspective that the demands of the BDS, as a peaceful response to illegal occupation and gravest war crimes, are in accordance with international law and are now also supported in part by EU governments. Even in Israel itself, opponents of the illegal occupation and expulsions usually see no alternative to institutional boycotts, because only international pressure will bring about change. Universities in Israel have particularly close ties to the arms industry and the military. The growing support for the BDS movement in Germany can also be seen as a reaction to German policy on the Middle East, in particular the failure since October 7 to clearly identify and politically address serious violations of international law by the Israeli army. This has shaken many people’s confidence that the German state and government respect international law and still want to contribute to a solution to the conflict, which is why more and more individuals and organizations are asking themselves what options for action they still have.

    https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/academic-boycott-konferenz-in-berlin-interview-doerthe-engelcke-rechtswiss-100.html

  • Critical international law, in solidarity

    Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja, “International law, populism and Palestine: An interview with Nahed Samour”, London Review of International Law 13 (2025), pp. 267-284.

    Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja, scholars of international law at the University of Melbourne, interviewed international law scholar Nahed Samour for the London Review of International Law on 15 May 2024. The interview is a master class on how to reconcile the critique of law with a realist and positivist engagement in order to prevent genocide and to pursue justice. It is a lesson in how to bridge the national, the international and the transnational; in connecting scholasticide with the authoritarian instrumentalization of emancipatory concepts such as campus safety; on the responsibility of university teachers and the power of student movements.

    A short summary can hardly do justice to the richness of the interview, which, albeit academic, is also a deeply personal and caring conversation between three relentless scholars about the status of the world and international law’s role and responsibility within it. It is an inspiration to learn what, in their view, the discipline of international law still has to offer, especially when it is informed “from below” and exercised in solidarity, in the struggle for self-determination and the right of all people not to live under the rubble of (post)colonialism, apartheid, political oppression and economic exploitation.

    Care is at the heart of this interview: care for people regardless where and who they are, care for your discipline, for our (academic) freedom to protest, work and think freely and together with each other beyond any type of borders; care about this unjust world, which compels us to be critical.

    Nahed Samour reminds readers and especially her colleagues in international law that the way we ask and frame questions about a situation and its evaluation under international law always has consequences in the material world.  These consequences are not so much felt by those doing international law but by those who are directly affected and who mostly stand on the margins of what the German and/or Western discourse considers to be the right legal perspective from which the world and its conflicts should be examined. The law itself, while coming in a language of the universal and building on the myth of the civilized liberal nation state, reinforces, under the disguise of the legal and objective, a truly unjust and violent world (dis)order for the many.

    And yet, today “referencing a legal system that is inherently bourgeois, liberal, and conventional [is being] regarded as a radical act.” Nahed Samour observes how legal terms such as genocide and apartheid are being “discredited as ideological terms, or Kampfbegriffe.” She identifies techniques of omission, e.g. by international lawyers who talk about violations of international humanitarian law by Israel but not about genocide, despite genocide cases against Israel pending before the ICJ. Other tools are the conflation  of anti-Zionism and antisemitism that allows for the instrumentalization of the latter, and the shameless devaluations of life that are responsible for persistent impunity, because the destruction of some lives does not matter as much as the destruction of others.

    The interview is an appeal to international lawyers not to sit back and not to be complacent, but to recognize the duty to prevent genocide as also directed at themselves; to question their own complicity and that of their institutions; to do justice to their responsibility as teachers and educators.

    https://doi.org/10.1093/lril/lraf014

  • Colonial versus anti-colonial transgressions of the civilian–combatant divide

    Nicola Perugini, “Between Anti-Colonial Resistance and Colonial Genocide: Gaza at the Limits of International Law”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, November 2025, 1–14, doi:10.1080/03086534.2025.2578214.

    Perugini highlights a major blind spot in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as to how it has recognised anti-colonial wars. Perugini points out that IHL’s limited recognition of anti-colonial violence – enshrined in the 1977 Additional Protocols which institutionalised the right to fight against colonial occupation through armed struggle – rests on a static state-centric framework where the civilian is imagined only as a passive, nonpartisan victim in need of protection, while it is the combatant who engages in violently dismantling colonial occupation and domination through anti-colonial resistance. However, historically we know that anti-colonial movements have challenged this IHL principle of distinction between civilians and combatants by blurring the line between the two in a collective struggle. Adopting the perspective of the colonized, Perugini thus calls for “decolonizing the civilian” in international law. To Perugini, this perspective “forces us to rethink the civilian as a figure of resistance rather than passivity” (p.2).

    In the context of Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza, the stakes around the distinction between civilians and combatants decide over life and death for most Gazans, and certainly for all males and even male children. As Perugini points out, Israel uses precisely this distinction to kill with impunity all those who dare to blur the line between civilians and combatants. The recent example of a local ZDF contractor also illustrates, how targetting of journalists is justified by Israel and German media by questioning the civilian status of journalists.

    More specifically, by drawing on Israel’s genocide in Gaza, Perugini highlights two dialectically entwined forms of transgression that are at odds with IHL. On the one hand, anticolonial forces merge the civilian and the combatant in their anticolonial struggle through, for instance, the network and infrastructure of tunnels which have a commercial and a military purpose. Through tunnelling, Palestinian resistance groups have undermined the distinction to be able to “challenge the asymmetry of the battlefield” through “subterranean warfare” (p.7). On the other hand, the state of Israel uses this very indistinction in order “to destroy the colonised people as people”. To Perugini, both transgressions of international law allow us to better grasp the limits of international law, as well as the relationship between colonial genocide and anticolonial resistance in settler-colonial contexts.

    Perugini’s call to decolonize the civilian in IHL thus allows us to better understand why anticolonial resistance necessitates the indistinction, and how IHL allows Israel to justify self-defence as a coloniser by denying the colonised their own right to self-defence. “This inversion of aggression and defence is central to the colonial logic of genocide.” (p. 10).

    https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2025.2578214

  • “Never again” must apply universally

    Schwarz, Alexander: “Scheitern in Gaza” [Failure in Gaza], südlink 213, 6-7.

    “Anyone who says ‘never again’ must mean ‘for everyone’ […],” writes Alexander Schwarz in his article. However, according to Schwarz, the German government insists on a raison d’état (Staatsräson) that is limited to unconditional solidarity with Israel. He points to the loss of credibility in view of the double standards that can be observed in the (lack of) application of international law, for example with regard to Ukraine – and the consequences for a rule-based world order and the principle of equality before the law: “Anyone who deliberately breaks with these principles places themselves outside the community of values to which they belong.” Domestically, too, the damage to the democratic framework is evident in the state repression of pro-Palestinian protests and the accompanying violation of rights guaranteed by the constitution.

    For Schwarz, “Staatsräson” must be framed by legal principles and doctrine, provided that one considers it a legitimate doctrine at all (cf. e.g. Andreas Engelmann, Über die erstaunliche Rückkehr der Staatsräson im Gewand der Moral y, Etos, August 22, 2024, for whom “[t]he concept of raison d’état […] only makes sense if it stands for interests that legitimize disregard for law and order. Otherwise, the state could simply abide by law and order.”): “It is not a question of ‘Staaträson’ or international law’, but of a ‘Staatsräson’ in conformity with international law.” Meanwhile Germany’s silence on crimes under international law and its supply of weapons to Israel damage the fundamental principles of the international legal order.

    In his article in the magazine südlink, Schwarz emphasizes the urgency of universal application of the law – “Now is the time to defend the principles of Nuremberg.”

    In this context, the repeated refusal of German courts to provide legal protection against German arms deliveries, with fatal consequences for the Palestinian civilian population, should also be pointed out; as well as the expert paper presented by Schwarz, among others, at the Federal Press Conference on October 2, 2025 “Beyond ‘Staatsräson’: How to reconcile historical responsibility, strategic interests, and international law. Expert paper for a change in Middle East policy.”

    https://www.ecchr.eu/publikation/scheitern-in-gaza

  • How the recognition of Palestine is being debated in France

    How the recognition of Palestine is being debated in France

    The wave of recognition of Palestine by Western states, in which Germany did not participate, owes itself to France’s initiative. President Macron is isolated domestically, has failed in many respects and is unpopular, but his foreign policy shows diplomatic leadership. That has also contributed to the discourse in France once again being broader and more open than in Germany. In France, it is already possible to criticize something that has not yet been achieved in Germany. A group of lawyers and professors, most prominently Rafaëlle Maison, professor of international law at the University of Paris-Saclay, is concerned with the potentially negative consequences that threaten to arise from the purely symbolic recognition of a de facto non-existent state—the state’s territory is eroded by Israeli settlements, its authority is undermined, and its people are exposed to genocide. Rafaëlle Maison published an article on September 11 spelling out the pitfalls of recognition, and gave an interview to the Le Média platform on September 13 to shed light on the “shadow zones” of Macron’s plan. Any policy of recognition should be measured by whether it serves or harms the right of peoples to self-determination, which is fundamental to international law.

    In the interview, Maison quotes from the letter Macron wrote to Netanyahu on August 25, 2025. Macron justifies his decision : “Our determination to ensure that the Palestinian people have a state is rooted in our conviction that lasting peace is essential for the security of the State of Israel.” The Palestinians’ right to self-determination is not mentioned in the letter. The horse is being put before the cart: the rights of the Palestinians are understood only as a function of the security of an ethnically and nationally defined Israel; not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. Diplomatic restraint towards Netanyahu alone cannot explain this. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 22, Macron explicitly acknowledged, unlike in the letter, the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” and spoke of “a people who draw strength from their history, their roots and their dignity.” And yet, here too, he cited French loyalty to Israel as the main reason for recognition: “Precisely because we are convinced that this recognition is the only solution that can bring peace to Israel.”

    Macron’s speech suggests that recognition should lead to an end to genocide aka war. But if the rights of Palestinians are always viewed as merely instrumental, then there can be no lasting peace. Maison exposes Macron’s recognition and his commitment against violence as lip service. The “normalization” he desires for Israel, which continues to violate (mandatory) international law, is to be imposed violently, with or without a Palestinian state. This is already evident in the first half of the letter, where Macron refers at length to France’s official acceptance of the IHRA definition of antisemitism. The adoption of the IHRA definition, “which condemns anti-Zionism as a form of anti-Semitism,” was one of his first official acts in 2017 and forms the basis for his policy of recognition. Macron’s interpretation of the IHRA definition, equating any opposition, however legitimate, to an exclusionary and ethnically defined state with hostility toward Jews as Jews, must automatically declare all Palestinians who have been expatriated and expropriated by Israel, and who naturally have a problem with this statehood, to be enemies of the Jews (not to mention that this equation itself is anti-Semitic). Macron’s letter to Netanyahu shows that the violent instrumentalization of the fight against anti-Semitism and the blanket defamation and exclusion of Palestinians as anti-Semites is far more than just a side effect or collateral damage of the current policy of recognition; it is inherent to it.

    But Rafaëlle Maison is interested in recognition primarily from the perspective of international law. She analyzes the “New York Declaration” of July 29, initiated by France and Saudi Arabia and also signed by Germany, as well as the “New York Call” issued on the same day by the foreign ministers of 15 Western states (Germany was not among them) as a reaction and a kind of diversionary tactic to distract attention from the opinion of the International Court of Justice “on the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation policy.” Exactly one year earlier, the ICJ had ruled that Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories was illegal, that Israel must withdraw from the territories and pay reparations. On September 18, 2024, the UN General Assembly then adopted Resolution ES-10/24 by a large majority (with Germany abstaining), which stipulates a halt to arms deliveries if they are used in the occupied territories and calls for a boycott of goods from Israeli settlements. Instead of following the ICJ opinion (which everyone, including the German Foreign Office, claims to respect), France and Saudi Arabia convened the UN conference on the recognition issue for July 2025.

    Rafaëlle Maison sees the results as “potentially in violation of international law as outlined by the ICJ in 2024.” The Palestinian state should, in the unlikely future that it is actually allowed to materialise, only exist under certain conditions: under the conditions that Hamas surrenders its weapons to the Israeli-controlled Palestinian Authority, which would effectively mean demilitarization (para. 11 of the declaration), the respect of anyone standing for election for the “international obligations” of the PLO (para. 22), the exclusion of Hamas, and the pursuit of a liberal reform agenda. On the latter, Maison writes: “These recipes sound a lot like a free-market program, compromising the sovereign choices of the state-to-be and requiring—incongruously in appearance, but in reality quite significantly—control over freedom of expression.” Lip service is paid to the right of return guaranteed under international law, but in fact they envision a “just solution” to the refugee problem through a “regional and international framework” (para. 39). And the future state would have to work on security arrangements that were “beneficial to all parties” (para. 20) – which, given the unequal power relations, could only mean that Israel would once again assume police and military power and authority in the weak state structure. The outcome would be a state without sovereignty, an “entity under control.”

    According to Maison, the “New York Call” in particular makes it clear what is really at stake: normalizing relations between all states and Israel despite the ongoing crimes – and not, as the ICJ actually prescribes, finally responding to these crimes with consequences. Thus, conditional recognition while the genocide continues is “indeed the latest stage in the ‘war against Palestine,’ as chronicled by historian Rashid Khalidi.”

    In fact, the situation will not be pacified, no matter what “solution” the international community finds to show Israel the “red lines” so that it abandons its annexation plans and finally ends the genocide; certainly not under a transitional governor Tony Blair in Gaza. Nevertheless, voices have been raised in France in recent days arguing that we should not stop at Rafaëlle Maison’s despairing analysis, but make the best of the new situation. The ongoing genocide, the daily mass deaths, killings, and murders must end immediately, and recognition facilitates the willingness to intervene. On Médiapart, Ilyes Ramdani credits the French initiative with at least putting enormous pressure on the US; the “Riviera” plans seem to be finally buried.

    On September 24, Ardi Imseis, professor of international law at Queen’s University in Canada, spoke to French MPs at the initiative of lawyer and member of the French National Assembly Gabrielle Cathala, and gave a lecture at the Sorbonne the following day. He advocates a “realistic,” “pessimistic” stance, insisting that both the legal fact of recognition and the fact of continuing legal obligations established by the ICJ opinion can be used to make demands on governments. It is a bitter reality, he says, that almost all countries in the world do not care about the survival and right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians themselves have no resources to defend themselves against the occupation. But when it comes to statehood, Imseis sees the glass as half full, where others see it as half empty. Almost independently of the situation on the ground, international law has also created its own reality over the years and decades. “It is clear that today, the State of Palestine already exists as a matter of both state practice and law, with or without recognition by France and other Western states.” Palestine was already recognized by 160 states before France’s initiative, was admitted to UNESCO as a full member in 2011, and can be a party to multilateral treaties. Precisely because attaching conditions to recognition conflicts with international law, it is possible to fight against these conditions. Recognition would make it easier to put pressure on states to correct their relationship with Israel and to respond to the occupation, apartheid, and war crimes with sanctions. In his analysis of the New York Declaration, Imsais thus comes to a very different conclusion than Maison: The Western governments that have recognized Israel are well aware that states are sovereign and that it is not possible to impose conditions on statehood; accordingly, their statements are formulated in a soft and ultimately non-binding manner. “Sovereignty is a curious thing. But as France so intimately knows (…), states have the perfect right to do whatever is not prohibited by international law.”

    Maison concluded her text with the fear that governments would use the UN General Assembly “under cover of the recognition of a Palestinian pseudo-state” to further undermine international law by disregarding the ICJ opinion, and that international law as a whole would be buried here. Imrais’ realism, on the other hand, sees “the contingency and disenfranchisement of the Palestinian Arabs” as enshrined in UN law itself, together with the “so-called two-state framework” of the 1947 partition plan. In the absence of other resources, the Palestinians could and must now work with this law.

    On Monday (September 29, 2025), Ardi Imseis and Rafaëlle Maison will talk to each other in the Jean Jaurès amphitheater in Paris. In Germany, one should listen carefully. Admittedly, the discourse has shifted in Germany as well, with the federal government distancing itself significantly from Netanyahu’s government. It is now even almost possible to say “genocide” without being slandered as anti-Semitic. But the totalitarian “Staatsräson” and the media’s windmill battles in its shadow still obscure the actual lines of conflict. The fruitless pros and cons of German provenance basically revolve around whether Israel should be allowed to do as it pleases or whether it should be forced to do what is best for it; whether the failure of Oslo gives Israel carte blanche or whether Israel must be brought back on the path of Oslo toward “peaceful coexistence.” And whether Germany is isolating itself internationally or whether the world “understands” Germany’s Sonderweg. What is still hardly debatable is the question of recognition in light of the failure of Oslo, from the perspective of what is right and just. In retrospect, Oslo was a serious mistake—a policy of appeasement that ignored all the important issues, shirked international legal obligations, and, in the long term, shifted the balance of power increasingly to the detriment of the Palestinians. This applies to the settlements, it applies to apartheid, it applies to the right of displaced Palestinians to return and to compensation for stolen property.

    Germany has decided against recognizing Palestine and, as always, will try to compensate for its lack of responsibility with financial payments. But it is also paying another price: that of ignorance, in Arendt’s sense. In the end, there might even be a case for saying that international law itself, through the partition plan, makes lasting peace impossible. But this discussion is also more likely to take place in France than in Germany.